C.f.: These two essays This: https://deponysum.com/2020/04/27/everything-is-negotiable-on-the-right-and-left/ And: https://deponysum.com/2019/04/21/money-and-the-sceptic-a-social-epistemological-case-for-taking-left-wing-economics-seriously/
Category: Philosophy: Normative Social Epistemology
Chesterton’s fence and thinking using sayings
“Common sense is a chaotic aggregate of disparate conceptions, and one can find there anything that one like.” -Antonio Gramsci I. Chesterton's fence is the principle that: "Reforms should not be made until the reasoning behind the existing state of affairs is understood. " (Courtesy of Wikipedia) It sounds so very reasonable- simply a more … Continue reading Chesterton’s fence and thinking using sayings
Four parts of belief
A little bit of prodding suggests that beliefs are not so simple as they seem. Consider for example Tamar Gendler's concept of an Aelief- a kind of belief-like state. An Aelief, per Wikipedia is: "...an automatic or habitual belief-like attitude, particularly one that is in tension with a person's explicit beliefs. For example, a person standing … Continue reading Four parts of belief
Money and the Sceptic: A social-epistemological case for taking arguments for redistribution seriously
I saw someone the other day put forward an argument against re-distributive taxation based on a study and a second person say ‘but that study is from the Cato Institute’. A bunch of people then jumped in to object that this was an ad hominem argument, and the study should be evaluated on our own … Continue reading Money and the Sceptic: A social-epistemological case for taking arguments for redistribution seriously
The Paradox of the Crowd
I want to introduce a new paradox. It’s not a strict paradox, but it is of practical concern: The majority opinion in almost every field is more likely to be correct than your own, if your opinion deviates from the majority opinion. This is true even the group has no more raw data than you- … Continue reading The Paradox of the Crowd
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